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I.  INTRODUCTION
Insecure applications at all levels have become a serious
problem for individuals, businesses, and our national security.
The best way to have secure applications is to write them
securely in the first place. The best way to maintain secure
applications is to ensure that all changes maintain the original
level of security and new security vulnerabilities are fixed
immediately. Our aim is to provide programmers with the tools
they need to detect and fix security problems as they write and
maintain code. These tools provide immediate feedback to the
programmer on security problems while they are editing, much
as current development environments provide immediate feed-
back on syntactic problems. 
The CHEETAH system provided an initial framework for
offering feedback on flow problems when the user rebuilds on
flow-related problems [11]. It offers a just-in-time strategy that
gives immediate feedback at a course level within seconds, and
then provides more detailed feedback over time. While it
defines a general strategy for converting a batch analysis into
an incremental analysis, it was only used with taint analysis.
However, experiments with CHEETAH showed that it could be
beneficial and that programmers liked the feedback. 
In this paper we show that it is possible to do a more com-
prehensive flow analysis for a variety of security problems that
can provide complete feedback within seconds without havingto resort to just-in-time methods. Our analysis is incremental,
multi-threaded, and can be specialized to the application at
hand, a necessity for security checking. It is capable of han-
dling relatively large (100’s of KLOC including libraries) Java
systems, and is suitable for integrating into a development
environment. Although our initial analysis may take up to a
minute, we can provide incremental feedback within seconds
on moderate sized systems, and in under a second on smaller
systems. This makes the analysis fast enough so that it can be
run as the user types rather than just when they rebuild, provid-
ing true immediate feedback. Finally, the system can be spe-
cialized to the particular security concerns of a system. 
Most security checking tools today, for example Microsoft
PREfix, HP Fortify, or Coverity, run off-line. They use a
variety of different analyses to detect potential problems over a
complete system, either source, binary, or a combination of the
two. While these tools are useful, they can be overwhelming to
the programmer. FindBugs [15], for example, running on a
large system, can return thousands of potential problems. Pro-
grammers can not deal easily with such output and tend to
either ignore it, restrict the tool to only find “known” issues,
not all potential issues, thereby missing some problems, or run
the tool infrequently [19]. Other tools, while providing more
detailed or accurate analysis, take significant time to process a
complex system. Programmers are not willing to spend this
effort after every minor change and hence the tools do not
always get run appropriately. This is the motivation both for
CHEETAH and for our approach.
Our analysis tracks the sources and types of values that can
reach each point in the program. The type information, based
on Java 8 type annotations, includes annotation-based subtypes
such as HtmlTainted or SqlUntainted. The analysis also main-
tains global type-state information such as User_Authenticated
or Role_Administrator for each program point. Customization
of the analysis permits the rapid addition of specialized secu-
rity checks to address new or uncovered vulnerabilities, the
ability to describe the specific security constraints of the
current application, and the ability to adapt the analysis to dif-
ferent frameworks and libraries. 
The analysis framework is integrated into the Code
Bubbles development environment [3] demonstrating its feasi-
bility. The analysis, once started by the environment, monitors
the programmer’s current working set and edits, updates the
analysis incrementally after edits, and provides asynchronous
feedback with the results. It also supports programmer queries
to provide more information about a potential error.
The contributions of this paper include:
• An architecture for a complete flow analysis, FAIT, that is
fast enough to run as the user edits with enough accuracy
to detect potential security problems;
• Resource files for customizing the analysis and making it
fast and accurate; 
• Techniques for mining the flow analysis to provide the
user with a detailed description of a potential problem; and 
• An initial integration of this tool into an integrated devel-
opment environment.
The remainder of the paper starts with an overview of
related work in Section II. The way we view security problems
is specified in Section III. A description of the flow analysis
framework is given in Section IV. Specialization of the analysis
is discussed in Section V. Incremental update is described in
Section VI. Mining the analysis to provide feedback is detailed
in Section VII. The integration into Code Bubbles is described
in Section VIII. Finally, an initial evaluation of the approach is
given in Section IX. 
II.    RELATED WORK
Type annotations were proposed as a means for doing
better static analysis of Java programs [10]. They are now part
of the Java language, although tools that make use of them are
not part of the distribution. The most common tool is the
Checker Framework [6], which runs as a separate process or as
an Eclipse plug-in, on demand by the user. 
Type annotations can be difficult to use [30]. For most type
annotations to be effective, a potentially large number of anno-
tations might need to be added to the program. For example,
the recommended way of using @Tainted annotations [12] is to
annotate all the locations in the program where there could be
tainted data [6]. This can be a lot of work, and work that would
have to be updated continually as the program evolves. Flow
analysis does an implicit type analysis in that it determines the
types of data that can flow to each point in the program and
does not require all the intermediate type annotations. Using
flow analysis rather than type analysis can simplify what the
programmer needs to do while still providing a reasonable
level of security.
Our flow analysis builds on large-scale analysis libraries
such as Soot [45] and Wala [17]. Our work on making FAIT
incremental is based on work in the areas of incremental exe-
cution [24,32] and continuous and incremental program analy-
sis [1,29,37,46]. Converting FAIT to multi-threading built on
past work in this area [21]. Recent work has demonstrated that
some program analysis, for example pointer analysis, can be
done quite efficiently incrementally [47]. Cobra provides an
example of a fast query interface for a flow analysis similar to
what we to provide [14].
Flow analyzers that attempt to handle larger systems often
have special means for handling libraries and native methods
including summarization of a library or a component [36], on
modeling of a library method through either procedural code
[23] or a specialized model based on the type of analysis [38];
on techniques for handling dynamic class loading [41]; and on
techniques for handling callbacks [36]. The notion of perfor-
mance analysis as applied to program synthesizers [2] can also
be applied to flow analyzers. The resource files used by FAIT
allow modeling library methods, handling dynamic loading
and other instance of Java reflection, and allow performance
tuning of the analysis.
The idea of using flow information while editing comes
from early work by Zadeck [46] which only addressed use-def
linkages that are handled by today’s compilers. Cascade infers
type annotations [44] based in part on the principle of specula-
tive analysis [5], i.e. showing programmers the consequences
of their actions ahead of time, which is one of our goals as
well. This work led to an on-line form of some of these analy-
sis which demonstrated its benefits [28]. Just-in-Time analysis
as in CHEETAH provides a compromise, with relatively fast
but specialized analysis that gets more detailed as the program-
mer waits [11]. Our efforts aim to go beyond this by doing a
complete analysis within seconds.
Safety conditions related to control flow rather than data
flow require a specification beyond type annotations. Such
conditions are more naturally represented as automata as in
Flavers [8] or CHET [33]. An alternative is to use temporal
logics such as LTL or CTL [7]. Within a data flow analysis,
these can be viewed as roughly equivalent, assigning a set of
possible states to each location in the program and updating the
sets based on the flow analysis which is what FAIT does.
Many tools have been proposed for off-line security check-
ing via static or dynamic analysis. While we have mentioned
the more general tools like PREfix, Fortify, Coverity, FindBugs
and Checker, there have also been numerous specialized
efforts. Shahriar and Zulkernine [39] and Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen [40] provide overviews of these. Lam, et al. used
queries over a deductive database as a lightweight means to
identify security problems [20,26,27]. Recent efforts along
these lines include JSPChecker [42], Andromeda [43], SFlow
[16], SymJS [22], Pidgen [18], and AndroidLeaks [13]. Our
efforts show that these off-line analyses can be done on-line
and the various specialized techniques for providing early
feedback are not necessary. 
III.  SPECIFYING SECURITY PROBLEMS
In order for security checking to be practical within a pro-
gramming environment it must be easy to define and specify
the security properties of each application. This means making
it simple and practical to define type-based security constraints
as well as state or automata based constraints. For each, the
developer needs to define the underlying properties and anno-
tate the program. 
Defining security constraints independent of an application
will not provide a complete or correct analysis. Security issues
depend on the application, its libraries, and the actual code
involved. For example, in checking for cross-site scripting2
issues, the incoming HTML can be sanitized before it is put
into a database or when it is taken from the database. These
two implementations require different sets of annotations.
Moreover, different applications might require different types
of HTML sanitization, allowing different sets of tags to persist.
The set of authentication roles is also application dependent. 
For type-based constraints, one needs to define the set of
type states the constraint can use, how these are defined by
type annotations, and how different operators can affect them.
Checker [6] does this by having the user write code. Our
approach is to define all the information in the resource file,
with each annotation requiring 50 or fewer lines of XML. This
involves defining the rules for merging two values, for restrict-
ing a value to a particular subtype, and for handling operators.
It also specifies when errors should be output. We = provide a
user interface to make this definition more convenient. One
difficulty is that the associated annotations need to be compiled
and available when compiling the source. We provide a generic
@Secure(...) annotation that can be used, but it is not as conve-
nient as direct annotations.
Using annotations with flow analysis is generally simpler
than using them with type analysis. One only needs to annotate
the sources and possible bad sinks for the flow, but does not
have to annotate all the intermediate locations. As an example,
we have taken an insecure web server developed for one of our
courses as a security exercise (based on a version of the
OWASP NodeGoat project [31] modified to use SQL). and
converted it into a Java-based server using nanohttpd. To
detect SQL injection attacks, we marked the input from the
user as SqlTainted using type annotations. We needed to do this
for the three input sources (request data, URL data, and cook-
ies). Then we annotated the query parameter on the SQL call as
SqlUntainted. A hidden annotation type, MaybeSqlTainted,
was used internally to track other data. A fourth annotation
type, SqlFullyTainted, is used to denote data that cannot be
untainted safely (e.g. by an sanitize routine). The type propaga-
tion rules indicated that any operation with tainted data yielded
tainted data, that concatenating a tainted string yields a fully
tainted one, and operations with only untainted data (which
includes all constants and initially all allocated items) yielded
an untainted result. With this model, adding these four annota-
tions was sufficient to detect the various ways that the server
was vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. 
To handle objects that have contents, for example arrays or
lists or maps, there are two choices. One can introduce addi-
tional annotations to indicate the content of an object is or is
not tainted, or one can actually apply any annotations on the
object to its contents. While the Checker framework does the
former, we decided to do the latter. Our experience showed that
this was easier for the programmer, required fewer annotations,
and did not affect what the programmer wanted to specify
since it would be rare to distinguish between the two.
Automata-based checks are useful for control-flow based
security problems such as those involving authorization or
access control. Our approach is to define events in the source
code that can be used to trigger state transitions in the automa-
ton. Automata are defined in the resource files as a set of states
and transitions based on named events, with some transitions
flagged as generating an error. A user interface is provided to
aid the user in this definition. Events currently are defined in
the program by calls to an empty routine KarmaEvent(
“event_name”) from the Karma library. This call can be used
in an assert statement for clarity. 
As an example, we used an automaton to check the authen-
tication logic in our insecure web server. To do this, we created
a simple automaton with states for NONE, USER, ADMIN,
and ERROR indicating the known and verified user role at
each point in the code. This was defined from about 30 lines of
XML. We added event indications at the start of URL process-
ing, where the user was authenticated, and where administra-
tive access was checked. We then added event indications at
each entry point in the code where we assumed that the current
role should be user or administrative. This yielded a total of
seven event indications. This was then sufficient to find the
problematic path whereby authentication could be avoided and
to validate that other paths were correct.
IV.  A FAST AND ACCURATE FLOW ANALYSIS
Checking type annotations and automata-based safety con-
ditions on-line requires a flow analysis that is fast, relatively
complete, and accurate enough to detect potential problems.
Our system meets this requirement and, with incremental
updates, is capable of providing feedback to programmers as
they type. The system offers a practical balance between accu-
racy and performance, includes means for handling complex
programs and libraries, and ensures that the various security
properties can be checked. 
When the system is used with the insecure web server
described above, it computes the initial set of potential security
problems in about 10 seconds, highlighting the error locations
in any editor open and in a separate window describing secu-
rity issues. After that, as the user edits, the set of problems (and
their corresponding displays) are updated almost immediately
(under 1 second). If the user attempts to correct one of these
problems, they will know right away if their correction is effec-
tive. 
Abstract Interpretation. FAIT does flow analysis using
abstract interpretation [9]. The system interprets the program
while maintaining an abstract state for each program point.
Where execution points merge, the program states are merged.
The analysis is thus flow-sensitive, but not path sensitive.
The system actually contains two abstract interpreters. A
byte-code interpreter is used to process library files and those
parts of the user’s program that are not currently being edited.
An abstract syntax tree interpreter is used to process files the
user is currently viewing and might be editing. The decision of
which interpreter to use is made at the start of each method. 
The abstract-syntax tree interpreter uses the Eclipse parser
to create abstract syntax trees and the S6 semantic analyzer to
do semantic binding [34]. It modifies the abstract syntax trees3
to move field initializations inside either a static initializer or
constructors, to add default constructors, to add implicit calls
to the super constructor, to define enumeration constants and
implied enumeration methods, and to merge static initialization
blocks into a single method. The interpreter handles implicit
calls derived from boxing and unboxing, enhanced for state-
ments, lambdas, catch and finally statements, and varargs.
Basic Data Types. The basic data types used by the inter-
preters are shown in Figure 1. These include sources, values,
and states. A Source is a representation of a specific value that
has a specific creation point in the application. The flow analy-
sis computes, for each source, all the points in the program to
which the source can flow. Sources that can represent objects
contain information about the values of the fields of the corre-
sponding objects. Sources that can represent arrays contain
information about the values of array elements, both for spe-
cific indexes and in general. This yields an effective shape
analysis for each object. Field values are also kept globally for
each distinct field for those cases where the source might rep-
resent an arbitrary object and for static fields. 
Special sources are created to represent arbitrary values
that might be returned by system routines or that are needed
otherwise. These can be fixed or mutable. Mutable sources are
automatically transformed into a new source with a valid
subtype of the original type where appropriate, for example at
a cast or a method invocation, provided that the subtype is
known to the system either a priori or through a class initializa-
tion. This is necessary, for example, to handle system methods
that return interface types or arbitrary objects.
The basic operations on sources include getting and setting
both fields and array elements as well as a mutation operator
which either returns the current source if it is of the right type,
returns a new source of the designated type if the current
source is mutable and the types are compatible, or returns null.
Sources are grouped together and generalized by typed
Values. Each value consists of the extended data type that
includes the basic Java type along with the associated sub-
types, a description of the set of valid actual values, and a set of
sources. The data type represents the information that would be
generated by a type analysis. 
The set of valid actual values can indicate any value of the
given type or can be more restrictive. Integer values maintain
separate upper and lower bounds, where either can be a
number or represent an unbounded value. Operations are
defined so as to maintain these bounds. Floating point numbers
are kept without bounds since flow analysis for security rarely
depends on the value of such variables. String constants retain
their value. 
Values are considered immutable and unique, that is, two
values with the same data type, same source set, and same
actual value constraints are the same object. 
The basic operations on values include setting and getting
fields and array elements, casting the value to a particular type,
and merging two values. Setting and getting field and array ele-
ments call the corresponding operator on each source; the cast
operator computes a new set of sources by restricting the
current set, either keeping, discarding, or mutating each source,
and then builds a new value accordingly. The merge operation
combines two values, taking the union of their source sets and
their actual value constraints, and computing a new data type. 
The abstract interpretation maintains the values associated
with the stack, each local variable, field, and array contents of
the application. Local variables and the stack are kept as part of
a State structure, which is computed for each reachable
program point. It also contains the values of any non-volatile
fields of the this-object that were explicitly set as well as the
set of automata states relevant to each defined automata-based
security property. 
The basic operations on a state include stack manipulations
such as popping and pushing values; getting and setting local
variables; and accessing fields. The latter operation checks if
the base value for the field access is ‘this’, and if so, either
includes the value in the state or returns the value associated
with the state if it exists. There is an operation to handle
automata transitions that takes an event name and updates the
set of automata states associated with the state. The final oper-
ation is a merge which combines two states. This does a merge
of the associated stack, local and field values and a union of the
automata states of the two states. It returns true if anything
changed in the merge.
The analysis decides, at each point where a method is
called, whether to create a new instance of the method for eval-
uation or to reuse an existing instance. Such instances are kept
in a Call structure. The call structure indicates the method, the
Source:
Fields:
Data Type with subtypes
Creation point
Field Map
Array Component Map
Operations:
mutateTo(Type) -> Source
set/getField
set/getArrayElement
Value:
Fields:
Data type with subtypes
Set of sources
Actual values (ranges, 
strings)
Operations:
castTo(Type) -> V alue
set/getField
set/getArrayElement
merge(Value) -> Value
State:
Fields:
Stack Values
Local Variable Values
Local Field Map
Automata-States
Operations:
push/popStack
get/setLocal Variable
get/setField
handleEvenytString)
merge(State) -> boolean
Call
Fields:
Method
Key
Initial state
Return value
Exception values
Program point -> state map
Program point -> error map
Set of sources 
Operations:
addInvokcation(Argument 
List) -> boolean
Program Point
Fields:
Call
Instruction id 
AST reference 
AST after reference
Fig. 1. Basic flow analysis data structures4
initial program state which includes the argument values being
passed in, the return value if it is known, the set of exception
values that might be thrown by the call, and the mapping of
locations to program states. Call structures also keep track of
all the sources explicitly created by that call and the set of
errors generated by type or automata conditions within the call.
Keeping this information in the call allows for simpler incre-
mental update.
At each method invocation, the system finds a set of call
objects, one for each method that could be called at that point.
The determination of a call object for a particular method is
based on the method, its source location, and the set of values
being passed as arguments. This process makes the analysis
partially context-sensitive. By default, all non-static methods
within the application proper have separate instances created
for each distinct value of the this parameter, while all system
and library methods have only a single instance. This is a com-
promise that provides a more accurate analysis for code that is
more critical to analyze, while still being efficient. The pro-
grammer can change these defaults for particular methods or
libraries through a resource file, either making the call non-
sensitive, choosing to only look at the this parameter, or choos-
ing to look at all the parameters. This information is repre-
sented in the key field of the call object. 
Call objects support an operation that initiates an invoca-
tion with a new set of arguments. This merges the argument
values with any prior values in the initial state and returns true
if this changes the initial state and thus the call should be
reevaluated. 
Program points indicate locations inside a call. For analyz-
ing byte code, they simply refer to the particular instruction of
the method. For source code, they contain two references to
abstract syntax tree nodes. The first is the node being inter-
preted. The second is the child of that node that just finished
being interpreted, which is null when the node is first evalu-
ated. This provides a level of detail for source interpretation
that is roughly equivalent to byte code instructions. 
Analysis Algorithms. The system maintains a work queue
of calls where the flow needs to be analyzed. For each call in
the work queue, it maintains a set of program points where that
analysis should start. The analysis is done one call at a time,
taking calls off this work queue. This approach allows the rela-
tively easy use of multiple threads, with a pool of worker
threads and a queue of methods to evaluate. The system uses a
priority queue, with static initializers being given priority over
constructors which have higher priority than normal methods.
Methods called from initializers or constructors inherit their
caller’s priority. 
The analysis starts with each main method in the applica-
tion and its entry point. The analysis also takes into account
JUnit test cases. Our experience showed that this provided
better coverage, especially for libraries or packages that are
used externally, When loading an application, it scans all
project classes for code annotated with the @Test annotation
and creates a dummy file with a main program that executes
(for flow analysis purposes) all the found tests. This takes into
account the appropriate @Before and @After annotations to
ensure the tests are set up correctly. 
The heart of the flow analysis is in analyzing a call one
instruction at a time as shown in Figure 2. This is done by
maintaining a work queue of program points within the called
method that need to be analyzed. The code takes the next
program point, finds the associated state, and then does an
abstract interpretation of the corresponding byte code or
abstract syntax tree node. 
The general result of this abstract interpretation is a set of
next program points and the next state value at those points.
Some instructions may have multiple next points, for example,
branches where either condition can be true in the given state.
Others might have no next point, for example, a field access
where the state indicates the base object must be null. For each
point and state in this result, the system checks if merging the
new state with any existing state at that point yields a change,
and, if so, adds the new state to the work queue.
These results reflect the effect of conditionals and other
statements that have data implications. For example, if a value
is tested and is known on one branch to be non-null, then the
program state for that branch will reflect that. Similarly, the
values will reflect integer bounds based on conditionals. Also
if a value is accessed so that it is known to be non-null, that
information will be propagated.
The interpreter has to handle a variety of special cases. For
field or array sets, it checks if adding the new value to the field
or array changes the value associated with the field or array
element, and if so, queues all references to that field. If the ref-
erences are within this call, the corresponding program point is
added to the work queue; otherwise the referencing call and
program point are queue in the system work queue.
If the instruction involves a return from the current method,
then the interpreter merges the returned value with the return
value stored as part of the call. If the result is a new value, it
AnalyzeCall(Call c, Set of Program Points pts)
Add pts to work_queue
While work_queue not empty
Let pt = remove point from work queue
Let st = state associated with pt in c
Do abstract interpretation of instruction at pt starting at state st
Result R = set of <next program point, next state> pairs
If interpretation involves a field (array) set then
For all references <fcall,fptt> to the field (array)
If fcall == c then add fpt to the work queue
else queue(fcall,fpt) 
If interpretations involves a return then
If the return value differs from that saved for the call
For each call site <ccall,cpoint> of c
queue(ccall,cpoint)
If interpretation involves an invocation then
Foreach call nc referenced the the invocation
add this invocation to nc
If this results in a change, queue(nc,start of nc)
If the call has a result value, merge it state
Foreach <npt,nst> in R
Let ost = state associated with npt in c
Let mergest = merge or ost,nst
If (mergst != ost) then
Save mergst as state associated with npt in c
Add nst to the workqueue
Fig. 2. Main Analysis Pseudo Code5
queues any call sites to the current method in the system work
queue. 
If the instruction involves an invocation of a method, then
the interpreter finds all call objects associated with this inter-
pretation. It first merges the arguments with the call by adding
this invocation. If this resulted in a changed initial state, it
queues the called method with its starting program point on the
system queue. If the call has an associated return value, then
this value, if not void, is merged into the current state. The set
of next states in this case will be empty if no call has returned
yet, will be the next instruction if a call has returned, and will
also be extended with states representing any exceptions
thrown by the calls. 
To speed up the flow analysis without compromising accu-
racy, FAIT uses special sources we call prototypes for particu-
lar classes. These objects simulate the effects of the various
calls on the source without doing any actual flow analysis. This
is currently used for the Java collection classes (subtypes of
Collection and Map) and for string builders (StringBuilder and
StringBuffer). These particular classes were chosen since
abstract interpretation of them can be expensive and we could
achieve as good or better accuracy though the simulation. The
prototype code tracks the internal values associated with the
prototype object, for example the contents of the collection or
the key and value collections for a map, and returns appropri-
ate values for the various method calls based on this. It also
handles changes in the interpretation process, queuing accesses
to the structure whenever the returned value can change. The
mechanism for implementing prototypes is general, and it is
relatively easy to add new classes if necessary. 
Backward Flow. While abstract interpretation represents
a forward flow analysis, there are points where information
should also flow backwards to provide more accurate check-
ing. For example, accessing a field based on a value implies
that value is non-null. This information can be propagated for-
wards (as above), but can also be propagated backwards so that
the source for that value is implicitly non-null. FAIT includes
facilities for doing such back propagation. The analysis can
flag a particular reference value (stack or variable slot) with the
information that should be propagated from a particular
program state. Then for each program state that led to that
state, the corresponding location of that value is determined
and back propagation continues. Such backward analysis is
done by updating the program states associated with a call.
Detecting Errors. Problem detection depends on the kind
of specification. Type-based specifications are checked when a
value is cast, either explicitly or implicitly (as in a call). The
restriction rules for a subtype can indicate that if a value V is
restricted to a value V', then an error should be generated.
These errors are saved in the call object at the program point
where they were detected. 
Automata-based specifications are checked on transitions.
If a transition is flagged as generating an error, then when that
transition occurs, an error is created and associated with the
program state that cause the transition.
The set of detected errors is returned to the caller once the
analysis is complete. 
Soundness. The analysis is basically sound in that it will
track all possible normal executions. It is conservative in that it
can generate executions that are not actually possible because
of the approximations used in representing values, sources, and
in reusing methods at different call points.
There are some possible points where the analysis might be
unsound. First, the analysis does not take into account the pos-
sibility of run time exceptions at each point where they might
occur implicitly. For example, it does not consider that each
object reference might throw a null pointer exception or that an
enhanced for loop might throw a concurrent modification
exception. It does handle exceptions that are explicitly thrown.
Second, the analysis within a method special cases non-volatile
field values of the this object, tracking their value with the
method. This analysis will not detect if the value can be
changed in another thread. Third, unless the user specifies
enough information in the resource files, the system might not
handle reflection and dynamic loading of classes correctly.
Finally, soundness depends on the resource files. If the user
uses the resource files to indicate that a routine should be
ignored, then the analysis is only sound if that routine has only
well-prescribed effects on the data flow. For example, it
assumes that the only methods called on input objects are
benign (e.g. equals, hashCode, toString), and that no internal
state is changed. Any other callbacks or side effects would
have to be handled explicitly in the resource file. 
The accuracy of the security errors flagged by the analysis
is dependent on the soundness of the analysis and on the accu-
racy of the user’s supplied annotations and the models used for
handling changes to the subtypes and program states. 
V.  RESOURCE FILES
Tuning the analysis for performance while achieving the
necessary accuracy can depend both on the application and the
checks to be made. Significant portions of the application or of
the included libraries are often irrelevant to the flow analysis
for the security problems of interest. For example, code to
parse resource files can be assumed to return any valid return
structure and need not be considered in detail. Similarly, unless
the checking is concerned with graphical output, most Java
Swing routines can be effectively ignored. 
To handle these application-specific items, FAIT supports a
hierarchy of resource files. The initial file is defined by FAIT
itself and covers Java library routines that are generally
unneeded or can not be interpreted (e.g. native methods). Each
user library can have its own resource file which can provide
information about that library or override the system file. Then
the application can provide its own resource files which over-
ride the library and system files. These resource files can be the
same as the ones used to define type and automata based condi-
tions. 6
The resource files are used to specify how routines should
be handled. The most frequent use is to specify that the flow of
a particular routine should be ignored and a call to that routine
should just be assumed to return an arbitrary (mutable) value of
its return type with subtypes based on the input parameters.
This can be done for individual methods, for all methods of a
class, or for all methods of all classes in a package. In the latter
cases, it is possible to provide alternatives for specific methods
or classes. The file can also specify a specific return type or
replace a particular method call with a call to a different
method. They can also designate whether a method should be
non-context sensitive, context-sensitive on the this parameter,
or context sensitive on all its parameters. The latter could be
used to identify libraries that are important to security analysis
and have those libraries analyzed in more depth. 
The flow analysis handles the complexities of real Java
systems including static initializers, native methods, Java
reflection, callbacks, and threads using this resource file as
necessary. It will automatically call the static initializer for a
class the first time the class is referenced or when indicated in
the resource file. Native methods are handled by assuming they
return an arbitrary value of the return type unless otherwise
specified by a resource file, with the system method arraycopy
handled internally. Class-based reflection is handled by return-
ing a mutable object in general. This can be made specific in a
resource file, for example having the method FileSystem.get-
FileSystem return an instance of a UnixFileSystem. Reflective
constructor calls can invoke a particular set of constructors.
Method based reflection is handled by having the resource file
note the method(s) that could be called at that point. 
Java programs often register callback objects, for example
in setting up user interface routines through Swing. In some
instances (for example, Swing), these routines are only called
based on actions that cannot be seen by the analysis. The
resource files let the user specify a particular call as registering
a callback and will then automatically invoke that callback
with appropriate arguments. Finally, threads are handled by
having the resource file map thread.start() into a separate invo-
cation of the run method of that thread.
VI.  INCREMENTAL UPDATE
Incremental update is handled at the file level. The system
maintains a list of files that have changed based on edit notifi-
cations it receives from the environment. It also listens for
messages indicating errors in the source. When it determines
that there are no errors and that files have changed, it triggers
an incremental update. 
The incremental update first updates any resource files that
have changed and then ensures that all files are compiled con-
sistently by building new abstract syntax trees as needed and
then recomputing all binding information. It then maps any
information in the existing flow analysis to use the new
abstract syntax trees and binding information. 
Updating the flow analysis itself is shown in Figure 3. It
begins by removing all flow information associated with the
updated files. Then it queues all locations that might be
affected by the changed files. Finally it uses the abstract inter-
pretation framework to update the flow until nothing changes.
The update works once for all changed files. It first com-
putes the set of calls that should be removed. This includes all
calls to methods in classes in the set of changed files as well as
all calls that are only invoked by calls that are being removed.
Next it removes all sources that were created in any of these
removed calls. This involves removing the source from every
source set it is contained in and results in a mapping of each
source set to its updated set. It uses this mapping to update all
saved values. These can be in fields, arrays, prototypes and
states. 
Finally the updater updates the flow analysis controller. If
any of the classes defined in the changed files were initialized
and have a static initializer, it notes that the class is no longer
initialized and adds the static initializer to the system work
queue. It adds all call sites of any removed call to the system
work queue. Finally, it adds any references to fields in the
updated files to the work queue. 
This process ensures that all methods in the updated files
that were invoked previously are checked again and the new
information is propagated. It also ensures that all internal
tables are links are updated. If new entities are created, they
will be propagated and handled by the reanalysis. 
The incremental update time is linear in the size of the flow
analysis data structures since internal data structures contain-
ing calls, source sets, and values are each scanned once. If this
becomes too slow on larger systems, it could be reduced at the
cost of some tracking overhead.
Incremental Update
Let UPD = set of all calls based on files to be updated
Let FLDUPD = set of all fields defined in files to be updated
Let SRCUPD = {}
Let CALLUPD = { }
Let SETUPD = { }
Let VALUPD = { }
Foreach call C in UPD
Remove C from set of calls
Foreach source S defined in C, add S to SRCUPD
Foreach call C’ invoked from C
Remove C as caller to C’
If C’ has no callers, add to UPD
Foreach caller site C’ of C
Add C’ to CALLUPD
Foreach source S in SRCUPD
Remove the source
Foreach entity sets ES
If the entity set contains any source in SRCUPD
Find the entity set NES = ES - SRCUPD
Add ES -> NES to SETUPD
Foreach value V
Let ES = entity set of V
Let NES = SETUPD(ES)
If NES is defined, then 
Let NVAL = value based on NES
Add VAl->NVAL to VALUPD
Foreach state, field, array and prototype
Replace internal values with VALUPD values if needed
Foreach class C that have been statically initialized
If C is in update set then
Indicate C hasn’t been initialized
Queue static initializer of C
Remove all calls in UPD from system work queue
Queue all calls in CALLUPD
Foreach fields F in FLDUPD
Queue all accesses to F
Fig. 3. Incremental Update Algorithm7
We note that, while the incremental analysis is still sound,
it can yield slightly different results than a complete reanalysis.
The incremental update may be more conservative than the full
analysis since stored values associated with fields and proto-
types are not fully recomputed and contain information associ-
ated with the old analysis. It might be more accurate in that
method calls that were previously merged, might yield a call
that is analyzed separately. 
VII.  PROVIDING PROBLEM EXPLANATIONS
In order to provide information about the potential security
problems that flow analysis identifies, the system needs to pro-
vide users with details as to why a problem was flagged. These
details can be viewed as a graph that shows a sequence of
events such as calls, variable assignments, loads, stores, and
operations, that lead from a relevant starting point to the point
of the error. The easiest way of computing such a graph from
the flow analysis is to do a backward analysis from the point of
the error to a valid starting point.
This backward analysis is done one step at a time. At each
step there is a context describing what is relevant, a program
point, and a graph node. The program point is used to deter-
mine the flow analysis state. Then all states that are immediate
predecessors of this state are considered and an appropriate
new context is created for the prior state if possible. If no new
context can be created, then the current graph node is checked
to see if it represents a valid starting point for the analysis and
is marked as such if so. As part of creating the new context, a
new graph node may be created linked to the current node.
This is done in cases where something relevant has changed,
e.g. a value was loaded onto the stack from a variable, a call or
return was performed, or a computation was done. 
What is relevant to the problem in a context and the compu-
tation of the prior context depends on the type of problem. For
a type-based error, the context includes the location of the
value (stack location, local variable, or field), the subtype
causing the error, and the subtype value of the error. For exam-
ple, it might note that the top of the stack contains a value for
SQL checking that is SqlTainted. The previous context deter-
mines where that value was based on the operation performed
between the previous state and the current one and determines
if the value from the previous state is relevant to the problem.
This might change the associated subtype value, for example
changing SqlFullyTainted to SqlTainted. 
For a state-based error, the context consists of the state con-
dition being checked and the state value for that condition. The
previous state is checked to see if it has the same state value
associated with the state condition. If it had a different value
and the value was not the default value for the condition, a new
next state is created based on the different value. If the differ-
ent value is the default value for the condition, the current state
is considered a valid starting point for the graph.
The actual algorithm is shown in Section Fig. 4.. The anal-
ysis itself is a work queue algorithm. The computation of the
prior state is handled in ComputeNext and HandleNext. Com-
puteNext deals with the start of a method, continuing the analy-
sis at each of these that is relevant. HandleNext handles
transitions inside a method. 
The bulk of the implementation is in dealing with the effect
of the code going from a program point to a predecessor. This
computes the prior context as well as a set of auxiliary program
points. The prior context includes an updated reference for sub-
types; The auxiliary points are used for variable, field, array, or
prototype sets if the instruction accessed one of these. Opera-
tions such as string concatenation, where there are multiple
potential prior references, will add the additional operands as
auxiliary points. Unanalyzed method calls are treated as opera-
tions based on their parameters. 
SafetyContext:
Fields:
Safety condition
Safety condition state
SubtypeContext:
Fields:
Subtype
Subtype value
Reference to value 
BackwardAnalyze(error)
WORKQUEUE = new Queue<ProgramPoint,Context,Graph>();
Let ctx = Build context for error
Let ppt = Program point of error
Let graph = initial graph node for error
Add <ppt,ctx,graph> to WORKQUEUE
While WORKQUEUE not empty
Let PPT,CTX = remove top of WORKQUEUE
ComputeNext(ppt,ctx,graph)
ComputeNext(ProgramPoint ppt,Context ctx,Graph graph)
Let curstate = program state associated with ppt
If ppt is at the start of a method then
Let priorctx = context for a call based on ctx
Let g1 = Add graph node for method entry to graph
Foreach call site of this call
Let st0 = program state at call site
If st0 is relevant to priorctx then
Let ngraph = Add graph node for call to g1
Queue <ppt,priorctx,ngraph>
Else 
Foreach prior state st0 of curstate,graph
HandleNext(st0,curstate,ppt,ctx)
HandleNext(State st0,State curst,ProgramPoint ppt,Context ctx,Graph g)
Let priorppt = program point for st0
Compute the effect of the code at st0 going to curst 
Yields priorctx : context at st0
Yields auxppts: List of program points of references
Foreach ppt in auxppts
Let st1 = state at ppt
Let auxctx = context for reference
If st1 is relevant to ctx then
Let g1 = Add graph node for store to g
Queue <ppt,auxctx,g1>
If priorctx is relevant to context then
Queue <priorppt,priorctx,g>
Else If priorppt is a method call
Let retctx = context for a return based on ctx
Foreach call pcall invoked form priorppt
If the call return is relevant to ctx
Foreach return state st1 in pcall
If st1 is relevant to ctx then
Let retloc = program point for st1
Let g 2= Add graph node for return to g
Queue <retloc,retctx,g2>
Else If priorctx is an automata state transition then
Let g3 = Add graph node for state transition to g
If priorctx is not a ground state for automata then
Let pctx = context for prior state
Queue <priorppt,pctx,g3>
Else
Mark graph node g as starting point
Fig. 4. Backward Analysis Algorithm8
When the previous state is the return from a call, the back
flow determines if the call was relevant or not (i.e. if the error
context can be found without considering the call). If the call is
not relevant, it is ignored. If it is relevant, a prior state is set up
for all returns from all routines that were called at that point
that would be relevant. When the current state is the start of a
method the back flow proceeds to each call site of that method
where the arguments or program state are relevant.
The context is used to determine if a prior state is relevant.
For a safety condition, this means it has the same automata
state. For a subtype condition, this means that the referenced
variable has the indicated value for the specified subtype. 
The system integrates this facility with the environment by
allowing problem-specific queries to be sent as messages. It
sends back a full description of the resultant graph.
VIII.  INTEGRATING INTO CODE BUBBLES
To demonstrate that FAIT can be used within a develop-
ment environment and used as the user types, we integrated the
initial implementation into the Code Bubbles development
environment. [4]. Code Bubbles is a working-set centric inte-
grated development environment designed to let the program-
mer easily view a complete working set (all the code needed
for a single task) and to simplify navigation. It is designed to
make it easy to integrate new tools [35], and provides all the
hooks needed to integrate a facility similar to what we needed. 
FAIT runs as a separate process, communicating with Code
Bubbles through messages. FAIT listens for messages regard-
ing new editors, file changes, and error messages; it queries the
environment to get information about the current project, the
class path, and the current contents of edited files. FAIT listens
to Code Bubbles for commands to start the analysis, to indicate
what files the user has open for editing, and to provide infor-
mation about a particular error. It sends the results of the analy-
sis asynchronously to the front end when it becomes available. 
If FAIT is enabled in Code Bubbles, it is automatically
started if the project uses the Karma library or standard Java
type annotations (annotations.jar). FAIT runs the initial analy-
sis and then waits for file changes or new files being opened.
After any such change, it waits until there are no compilation
errors and then starts an incremental analysis. If a change
occurs while analysis is being done, the analysis is suspended
so that it can be resumed as part of the next incremental update.
To check the results of the FAIT analysis, we added a pre-
liminary user interface to Code Bubbles for showing and
exploring security problems. The user can bring up a window
that contains a table of detected problems which can be sorted
by problem name, file, or severity. An example of his window
is shown in the bottom left of Figure 5. The table can be used
to go to the particular source file. 
In addition, an annotation is created for problem lines in
any editor displaying the corresponding source. Such annota-
tions can be seen as the purple circles in the annotation bar of
the editors on the right side of Figure 5. Hovering over these
annotations will bring up a short description of the error.
Fig. 5. Annotations showing problems and the problem table view.9
From either the annotation or the error table, the user can
request an explanation of the problem. This uses the query
mechanism of FAIT to return the problem graph. The graph is
displayed one path at a time in a simple interface that shows
where there are alternative paths and lets the user explore such
paths. An example of this is shown in the upper left of the
figure. The user can click on the lines here to bring up the cor-
responding code editor. In addition, when selecting or moving
through the lines here, the corresponding editor locations will
be highlighted. Clicking on the fork icon in the display will
show the next alternative path in the flow graph at that point. 
The explanation shown in the figure is for the use of tainted
HTML data in the routine render (shown at the lower right).
The error is detected at the call to doRender. The explanation
notes that this is due to the variable context being tainted. The
next line of the explanation indicates that context was passed in
as a parameter in a call from displayAllocations (upper right
window) at line 71. The offending second parameter was then
set at line 70 using the result of a database query. This is a
potential problem since the data stored in the database is not
assumed to be HTML sanitized.
In addition, we created an interface for viewing and editing
the resource files. This is shown in the bottom right of the
figure. The interface contains four tabs. The first lets the user
view, edit and create subtypes. The second lets the use view,
edit, and create automata-based safety conditions. The third
identifies instances of Java reflection in the flow analysis and
lets the user customize these. The final one, shown in the
figure, provides performance information to let the user tune
the analysis to the application. This includes information (in
the last column) as to whether this routine or class seems
important to the security analysis. 
IX.  EVALUATION
To test our flow analysis and determine if it is practical to
integrate into a development environment so it can be run as
the user edits, we did a range of experiments using the Secu-
ribench test suite from Stanford [25]. As distributed, this con-
sists of seven Java projects that are serlvet-based web
applications with some security problems. In addition, we used
the insecure web server from our web course described earlier.
Setup. The code in Securibench is relatively old, designed
for Java 1.4 rather than the current versions of Java. We first
updated the code so that it compiled under Java 10 without any
compilation errors, mainly by using generic types and replac-
ing deprecated calls, but also by fixing obvious bugs in places
and moving to the newer version of JUnit. We then created a
library of mocking classes to be used in place of Tomcat or a
similar Java web framework. This library includes 11 classes
that handle input, output, request data, response data, configu-
ration, and sessions.
Next we added security annotations in the resource file for
the mocking library that marked calls to SQL query routines as
non-SQL-tainted (12 annotations); that marked output to Serv-
letOutputStream or JspWriter as non-HTML-tainted (10 anno-
tations); and that marked the various calls to open files as non-
FILE-tainted (7 annotations). These were added in the resource
file for the mocking library. We also marked the calls returning
information a malicious user has control over in the mocking
library as tainted (24 annotations). No annotations were added
directly to the individual projects. We also considered our inse-
cure web server described earlier. This did not use the mocking
framework and included 8 annotations and 7 event triggers in
the actual code. 
Securibench introduced a dummy class InvokeServlets for
flow analysis that called some of the available servlets. This is
designed to take the place of a web server framework such as
Tomcat that invokes servlets using reflection and dynamic
class loading. We found the provided dummy classes to be
insufficient in that a) they did not include all servlets or JSP
calls; and b) they did not make the appropriate initialization
calls to set up the servlets. Our analysis is sensitive enough so
that if the initialization calls were not invoked, many of the
flows leading to potential errors were considered impossible.
To deal with these problems, we created a small package
that scans the configuration files for the project and creates our
own dummy class. This class invokes all user servlets and
related calls (actions and JSP tags) after doing the appropriate
initializations. We noted that the while in most cases this
increased coverage, there was at least one case (jboard) where
the configuration files did not include classes that Securibench
analyzed by having explicit calls in InvokeServlets that did not
have a corresponding configuration file entry. 
Next we created a resource file for each of the Securibench
projects. This first enabled SQL, HTML, and file taint check-
ing. Next it dealt with uses of Java reflection in the packages,
noting which objects were created implicitly by calls to newIn-
stance or other routines. Where we found sanitization methods,
we added annotations for them. Finally we added a small
amount of tuning for external libraries (we explicitly did no
tuning for files in the project itself), mainly telling the system
to ignore XML parsing (Apache Xerces libraries) and logging
(Apache logging library). 
A summary of the projects is given in Table I. The first
seven projects are from Securibench; the project javasecurity is
our insecure web server. The second column indicates the
number of lines of source in the project, while the third is the
number of files. The fourth the number of classes analyzed.
Since the number of source classes is approximately the same
as the number of files, this shows that libraries constitute the
TABLE I: PROJECT INFORMATION
Project LOS #File #Classes Resource File
blueblog 4,434 32 342 37
jboard 10,375 68 1,549 32
pebble 43,092 334 1,317 129
personalblog 6,219 38 1,292 16
roller 48,292 233 2,230 46
snipsnap 48,199 438 2,076 298
webgoat 8,715 36 300 29
javasecurity 2,065 12 1,190 7310
bulk of the code to be analyzed and hence that the number of
lines of source is an under approximation to the complexity of
the projects. The last column gives the size of the created XML
resource file in lines. The snipsnap project uses a lot of Java
reflection, hence its larger size.
We then ran the flow analysis on the various projects using
a JUnit test framework that ran Code Bubbles in background,
started up FAIT on the project, and then sent the appropriate
messages to FAIT to open all source files and invoke the analy-
sis. The experiments were run on a workstation with 2X AMD
Opteron 6140 8 core 2.6ghz processors and 128 G of memory.
(None of the runs required more than 8G of memory.) 
Flow Analysis. We did an initial flow analysis on each of
the eight projects, determining the run time with 1, 2, 4, and 8
threads, counting the number of problems that were detected,
and analyzing those problems. 
The results are shown in Table II. The second column lists
the number of problems found. We looked at each reported
problem to determine if it was justified by the code and the
initial set of annotations and represented a potential problem.
Two of these (one from roller and one from snipsnap) were
obvious non-problems. The rest represent possible security
errors. This yields a precision of 95% (38/40) on the Secu-
ribench projects. The original Securibench study flagged an
error as a source-sink combination. FAIT only flags the sink as
the error, leaving the finding of sources to problem explana-
tion. We checked that the sinks for all errors reported in the
original study corresponded to errors reported by FAIT. Thus
our tool is at least as accurate as Securibench. Other differ-
ences between the two studies include that the security annota-
tions are slightly different, minor fixes have been made to the
code, and the initial invocations are different. 
For javasecurity, which we were familiar with, we verified
that all the security issues we were aware of related to the prob-
lems that we explicitly addressed (SQL, HTML, files, and
authentication) were flagged. We also verified that all the prob-
lems flagged were actual problems.
The third and fourth columns give an indication of the work
done by the flow analysis. The third column is the number of
times the analysis of any method was started; the fourth is the
number of abstract instructions executed by the flow analysis.
These could be actual byte code instructions or visits (initial or
backtracking) to an abstract syntax tree node. 
Analyzing the performance data from the analyses, we
noted that there were potential areas of improvement. One
involved the hibernate library to provide a level of persistent
objects. jboard, personalblog, and roller made use of this
library, and at least 10% of the analysis was spent on it. If this
were deemed not relevant to the security issues at hand or
could be summarized, it could be eliminated. For snipsnap,
much of the analysis came involved the deserialization code.
For webgoat, over 60% of the time was spent in one routine
(Screen.setup), and in the HTML setup methods it called. 
The fifth column is the initial compile time needed. This is
a worst case time where we are compiling all the files in the
project. This is unrealistic for the larger projects in that users
will rarely have hundreds of files actively open at one time.
This time also includes the cost of loading and analyzing
binary files, a one time cost that can be significant. 
The next four columns show the time to actually complete
the full initial analysis in seconds with 1, 2, 4, and 8 threads.
These show that using multiple threads is somewhat effective,
especially for the larger analyses, although that effectiveness
drops off after 4 threads. 
Finally, the remaining two columns provide information
about querying for explanations of all the problems found. The
first shows the average time in milliseconds needed to process
the query. The second is the size of the returned graph, provid-
ing the average size as well as the maximum size. The average
query time is well under a second. The graph size varies
widely. The larger graphs typically occur when a problem
occurs in a library routine, has multiple sources, and the flow
involves fields or collections. By looking at these large graphs,
one can find the critical user routines and annotate them. This
will create smaller, more understandable graphs. We did this
for personalblog. The original graph had over 8,000 nodes and
showed an error in a library routine, but all paths passed tainted
data through a call to SessionImpl.find. We annotated this call
and found the same problems with 5 much smaller graphs. We
note that while this annotation simplified the resultant graph, it
did not change the underlying flow analysis.
Incremental Analysis. To measure the cost of incremental
analysis, we measured the run time to update the analysis after
a single source file was changed. Since most edits will only
affect a single source file, this test should be representative of
incremental changes. Moreover, since we completely recom-
TABLE II: INITIAL FLOW ANALYSIS EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Project #Problems False Positives #Methods #Instructions
Compile Time 
(seconds)
Analysis Time (in seconds) Query Time 
(ms)
Graph Size 
(avg/max)1 2 4 8
blueblog 4 0 2,988 65,489 5.7 3.3 2.6 2.1 2.2 43 21 / 41
jboard 0 0 89.671 1,308,551 8.1 58.3 36.4 24.0 19.1 n/a n/a
pebble 8 0 27,619 621,974 10.6 19.9 13.4 10.6 9.4 18 27 / 51
personalblog 5 0 66,697 1,196,427 7.8 56.8 35.9 25.0 21.0 19 13 / 39
roller 11 1 154,589 2,946,895 11.4 112.4 71.3 51.3 46.3 174 945 / 9870
snipsnap 3 1 161,586 5,481,878 10.8 154.2 90.1 67.0 52.2 540 6225 / 18652
webgoat 9 0 31,415 1,488,232 5.5 30.0 18.5 11.9 10.4 13 10 / 14
javasecurity 10 0 3,766 91,971 6.4 4.7 3.4 3.1 2.7 26 28/ 10711
pile and reevaluate the file, what changed does not matter.
Where the project had included more than 50 files, we ran-
domly selected a subset of about 50 files for the test (choosing
a file with probability 50/N). Note that we did not actually
change the file, but only told FAIT it had changed, which was
equivalent.
When running the test, we also made sure that the reported
errors remained the same. The results of these experiments are
shown in Table III. 
The second column is the initial analysis time in millisec-
onds (taken from the prior table). The next two columns show
the average time (in milliseconds) of recompiling after a
change and then updating the existing data flow to reflect the
changes needed by incorporating the recompilation and remov-
ing all items from the changed files. The compilation times are
significantly less than those for the initial compilation, but still
reflect having to compile all the sources rather than the ones
the user might have open. 
The update times are dominated by the size of the original
data flow analysis data structures since several of these struc-
tures are scanned as part of the update as noted in Section VI.
These times will vary slightly with the size of the update or
how wide-ranging the effects of the edited files are in analysis,
but not significantly. We note that there is considerable room
for improvement in the update algorithm. 
The next columns show the timings for the incremental
analysis, providing the average, median, min and max times in
milliseconds. These times vary widely. The low values for the
median time show that, for the majority of the files, the analy-
sis is almost immediate. (The total time is be dominated by the
compilation and flow update time.) Some files, however, can
take considerable time (about one-half of the full analysis
time). Typically these are files that provide a starting point for
potential flows that then have to be reconsidered throughout
the analysis. 
The total update time (compilation + update + analysis) for
the various applications, shown in the last column, varies from
well under a second to almost 13 seconds for the more complex
applications. These update times would be sufficient for incre-
mental update, although the times for larger applications are
currently marginal for immediate feedback. 
There are some obvious ways that these times could be
improved. First, better tuning of the analysis through the appli-
cation-specific resource file would yield a smaller analysis and
hence faster update and analysis times. Second, the incremen-
tal update algorithm could be modified to avoid scanning the
whole data structure and only scan what was changed. While
this would complicate the update algorithm, much of the
dependency information is already available to do this.
Third, update could be done at the method level rather than
the file level when possible. This would require additional
bookkeeping to determine what methods changed, but would
otherwise fit into the incremental analysis framework and
would reduce the actual analysis time. 
Fourth, the bulk of the reevaluation time, especially for the
longer runs, involves tracking sources created in the edited
code. The original sources are removed wherever they
occurred, and the flow for any new sources to all of these loca-
tions needs to be recomputed. It might be possible to reuse the
original sources which would limit the update to places where
the types or subtypes associated with those source change.
Comparison of Results. There are other tools available to
do the types of analysis that FAIT accomplishes. The two
primary ones are the Checker framework and the CHEETAH
system.
As we have noted, Checker is able to do the subtype check-
ing that FAIT does. However, doing it for these examples
would have required substantially more type annotations since
one would need to annotate all the locations that a value might
flow to within the code. We were able to do this by simply
annotating the mocking library. 
CHEETAH does a just-in-time flow analysis, so it can
produce results quite similar to ours. However, it currently
does only taint analysis and doesn’t handle general subtypes or
automata conditions. Our incremental update times to produce
full results are about the same as CHEETAH uses to provide its
initial, more general, results. Our initial computation times are
generally less than CHEETAH's time for its full analysis. Note
that this is not a direct comparison as CHEETAH was run on
different systems, 
Threats to Validity. There are several threats to the valid-
ity and applicability of these experiments. First, the projects
might not be representative of modern applications. The Secu-
ribench projects are all web applications and are 10+ years old.
We tried to analyze the current version of Webgoat, but it uses
TABLE III: INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Project Initial Time (ms)
Compile Time 
(ms)
Update Time 
(ms)
Incremental Timing (4 threads) (in ms) Total Avg. Update 
time (ms)Average Median Min Max
blueblog 2,142 175 126 55 37 30 155 356
jboard 24,003 275 1,484 2,334 45 31 9,822 4,093
pebble 10,583 958 1,124 191 47 37 806 2,273
personalblog 24,974 223 1,091 2,928 69 31 9,226 4,242
roller 51,315 1,434 4,397 6,613 172 44 23,691 12,444
snipsnap 66,976 1,408 4,172 3,455 59 49 12,169 9,035
webgoat 11,896 236 767 318 35 28 3,560 1,321
javasecurity 3,123 97 156 74 61 33 189 32712
Java bean processing to effectively add or modify the code at
run time using reflection, a capability that makes it difficult for
any static analysis to work. 
Other types of applications might have different behaviors.
We have run the analysis (generally without checking for prob-
lems) on a variety of systems to validate that it works, it scales,
and the results seem to be correct. For example, working on
FAIT itself involves a set of projects totaling 130KLOS. The
initial evaluation takes 20-30 seconds, but the incremental
updates are typically done in 1-2 seconds. Certain items, such
as parsers seem to require much more analysis time than other
types of code, but are easy to deal with in resource files. 
Next, the flow analysis involves both randomness in the
choice of what method to work on next and multiple threads.
This means that runs on the same source will be slightly differ-
ent in terms of effort and running time even though they gener-
ate the same result. The variation seems to be less than 1%, so
the numbers are probably accurate, but there is always the pos-
sibility of a particularly bad ordering that causes excessive
recomputation. Also, since the flow analyzers for byte and
source code are different, different combinations of source files
might yield different timings. Our experiments were done
using source for all the project files. Finally, randomness was
involved in selecting which files were updated.
We did minimal tuning in the resource files for the particu-
lar applications. In actual usage, we would expect that more
tuning would be done and hence the timings could be signifi-
cantly smaller. In particular, it should be possible to avoid
doing a full analysis of libraries such as hibernate or irrelevant
aspects of the actual code. Our experience is that we can cut
the initial analysis time in half with minimal specifications and
will also reduce update times.
We have done minimal performance tuning of FAIT, espe-
cially for multiple threads, and expect that we can reduce the
timings by doing so. Finding and eliminating synchronization
bottlenecks could increase the effectiveness of using multiple
threads. Finally, we note that the code still contains bugs which
could affect both the performance and accuracy.
Limitations. While FAIT is a good first step toward con-
tinuous flow analysis, it has its limitations. The first is that it
requires the developer to create a resource file in order to be
effective. This might be needed to achieve the desired perfor-
mance, and is needed to handle any uses of reflection in the
system, as well as to define the security properties of interest.
Additional resource files might have to be created for the
various libraries the system uses, although these can be part of
the developers resource file.
Second, FAIT does not handle the latest Java capabilities.
Because we are using our own compiler to create annotated
abstract syntax trees for code that is actively edited, FAIT can
only handle constructs we can compile. We currently handle all
of Java 10. FAIT also cannot easily handle programs that make
extensive use of reflection to effectively change the code at run
time. 
Third, FAIT can require significant CPU and memory.
Although it runs in background and we are generally using it
with 4 threads, it can make use of all those threads and has
been using 4-8 G of memory on larger runs. A developer would
need to have a powerful workstation or set it up to run on a sep-
arate machine. 
Finally, as we noted, the explanations can be long and have
many paths. It can be difficult to understand or explore an
explanation with thousands of nodes. The developer can get
around this by adding appropriate annotations to the code or
resource files as we did for pesonalblog, but that is more work.
X.  CONCLUSION
We have developed a flow analyzer aimed at identifying
security problems that achieves a balance between perfor-
mance and accuracy. It is designed to run incrementally as the
user edits, providing almost immediate feedback on potential
security problems. It uses flow analysis to minimize the
number of annotations needed to define potential security
issues. It uses a resource file to tune the analysis and to define
the particular security problems of interest. It can provide
detailed explanations of any problems it finds. An initial
version of the tool is integrated into the Code Bubbles develop-
ment environment.
The system is available. The source for the analyzer, the
mocking framework, and the karma library are available on
GitHub. The current version of Code Bubbles on SourceForge
includes the code for integrating with FAIT. Our version of the
Securibench projects and our javasecurity project as well as the
scripts used to run the various experiments are available from
our ftp site.
Finally, we note that while FAIT is currently running with
Code Bubbles, it is designed to be independent of the actual
programming environment. It runs as a separate process and
uses asynchronous messages to communicate with the environ-
ment. Another environment could easily be made to send
similar messages where needed and thus use the framework
without modification.
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